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Ten years ago, the following five propositions were
generally believed:
that very large amounts of cereals, typically
30-50 per cent, were lost between the harvest and
the stomach;
that such losses were highest in traditional PHT
systems, especially on small farms;
that modern PHT could drastically reduce these
losses;
that such loss reduction was economically cost-
effective for both farmers and society;
that a major reduction in hunger could be
achieved by reducing grain losses through modern
PHT.
In many quarters, this remains the conventional wisdom.
Much conventional wisdom is conventional because it
is wisdom. But these five propositions seem to be
wisdom only because they are conventional. There is
now convincing evidence that all five propositions are
incorrect.
Unfortunately production planning by PHT suppliers,
and economic planning by national and international
policy-makers, involve long time lags. In many
countries, therefore, major resources (and supporting
international efforts) are being diverted into quite
inappropriate PHT activities. These activities may
well provide work for aid officials and planners, and
profits for the makers of modern PHT in the form of
silos and mills. The net effect, however, will be to
increase grain losses, not least by stimulating cross-
haulage; to redirect grain, from efficient on-farm PHT
systems, into systems in the private and public surplus-
handling sectors where incentives to efficiency are
much less direct; and, through employment effects
among others, to worsen hunger.
Since 1975, IDS has been involved in collaborative
research in India and Bangladesh, measuring various
sorts of post-harvest paddy and rice losses in 26
villages. In this brief introduction, I would like to put
our results into the context of other studies, involving
different areas and crops. I will set out the evidence
for five propositions about post-harvest grain loss and
PHT which are very different from the five beliefs of
spaper presented at the Post-harvest technology workshop
held in New Delhi by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Irrigation, Government of India and the Institute of
Development Studies in January 1981.
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ten years' ago, listed above. Finally, I will ask what we
can learn from this story of 'conventional wisdom
rejected' in PHTa story in which India's scientific
and economic expertise, and her extraordinary switch
into grain surplus, plays a major part about the place
of technology, and of the planning of technology, in
the fight against hunger. In PHT the main lesson is to
switch Food Corporation of India (FC I) procurement
policy gradually towards the purchase of liens (prior
claims) upon grain stored and processed at family-
farm level.
The five propositions, noted above, can now be replaced
by the following five:
on-farm grain losses, between harvest and
consumption, are typically five to eight per cent of
grain output, and very rarely above 10-12 per cent.
But even these losses cause concentrated suffering
just when grain is scarcest. It is worth preventing
them if this is not too expensive;
losses in traditional PHT systems are typically
lower than in modern systems;
simple, locally-produced improvements in
traditional PHT are often cost-effective, privately
and socially, in saving small amounts of grain;
heavy, capital-intensive PHT seldom pays; where
it does amply cover costs (as with some huller-
mills), there can be severe social consequences;
in particular, even where modern PHT saves
grain, and does it cheaply, it tends to displace highly
labour-intensive activity, in working traditional PHT
and in producing it. The lost employment, especially
for landless rural women, may well damage poor
people's nutrition much more than the small amounts
of saved grain improve it.
Small but Significant Grain Losses
It is still common to see claims that 30-50 per cent of
harvested grain is wasted. But farmers, especially
hungry ones, are not fools. So it is not surprising that,
even before our work, the few estimates that actually
tried to measure losses produced far lower figures. In
the late 1960s, a five per cent storage loss rate for
maize in central Africa, and five to six per cent for
maize and guinea-corn in Nigeria, were measured. In
1976-78, in 18 Andhra villages and over 200 stores over
two years, we measured average paddy losses in store
of 4.26 per cent (1.33 per cent at 95 per cent), with an
average store life of 7.02 months (je an average period
of grain in store, assuming smooth rundown, of 3.51
months). In eight Bangladesh villages over two years,
paddy losses in all PH operations totalled below eight
per cent. Wheat storage loss rates in the Punjab in the
early 1 970s were about six per cent. Other results from
India and Nepal and from several SE Asian countries
all confirm these sorts of loss-rate for Asian farm
households [see refs in Greeley 1982 J. As for Africa,
the Tropical Products Institute's work on maize in
Zambia and Kenya, and Gugenheim's work on millets
among the Dogon in Mali,produced similar estimates
iGugenheim 19781. While exceptionally bad stores
and seasons do turn upand while the last, mouldy
remnants of the worst stores are what visitors are
shown and rememberall the systematic PH
measurements of storage loss, in the 60-70 per cent of
grain typically stored at farm household level in the
Third World, are of the order of three to eight per
cent. The huge estimates of 30-50 per cent are
guesstimates extrapolated from isolated, extreme and
thus nonrandom situations.
Similar remarks apply to other PH operations. For
example, most of the grains lost in both threshing and
husking are later gathered and eaten by very poor
people, and in a social sense are not 'lost' at all.
Why, where and when might it be sensible to try and
do something even about these relatively small loses?
It is reasonable to suppose, in many cases, that by cost-
effective technical change, a four per cent storage loss
at farm household level can be cut to two per cent.
That could, in a typical case, mean one week's grain
needs for a family. This week's worth of 'saved' grain is
available just when the stock, on the family farm or
household, would otherwise run out. In a one-crop-
season village, that is often near the end of the wet
season, when pre-harvest work is heavy, grain dear,
and credit is also dear and scarce. Food needs are
highest at this season - also because disease vectors
are most prevalentyet food is hard to come by.
Hence, in areas with only one crop season, improved
traditional PHT can help very poor people to avoid
hunger and debt at critical periods. In multi-crop
areas, average periods in store are shorter, so that PH
grain losses are generally lower. But some modern
PHT is on its way in, becauseespecially in milling
and threshingit can pay economically, even with no
open or concealed subsidy. Here too, PHT planning,
especially of the organisation of ownership and control,
is needed if the poor are to benefit. Otherwise they
can become the unemployed victims of new PHT.
So there are two main cases where, despite the small
losses, major public-sector intervention in PHT is
justified. The first is where the losses concentrate risks
of hunger, hardship and debt on particular at-risk
groups and seasons especially where double cropping
is rare. The second is where modern PHT, while
commercially and economically justified, must be
planned if employment effects, on those initially
working or making older PHT, are not to increase
their poverty and hunger. Without intervention, in the
first case 'the market' does not enable the poorest to
acquire PHT assets, or to suck new techniques out of
their fingers. In the second case, 'the market' works all
too well, but the poorest suffer.
Loss Rates: Old versus New PHT Systems
Both old, very small, on-farm PHT, and some large-
scale modern systems, offer low loss rates due to
accurate and swift loss detection and control. Losses
in large, properly supervised, permanent grain silos
are thus low. So, at considerably smaller costs of loss
prevention, are losses in small grain stores in farm
households, where insect or rat damage is usually
detected and isolated quickly.
Intermediate systems, though, may suffer higher losses
than either traditional or modern ones. Loss rates in
temporary storage are notoriously high. Engelberg
huller-mills cause somewhat higher losses than either
mortar-and-pestle or modern rice mills (though, under
practical field conditions, the latter are costlier per
unit of throughput than huller-mills). Merchant storage
and processing in small rural towns, since it involves
numerous small and brief grain throughputs, is relatively
wasteful, because loss per ton for only a few days is
inconspicuous and not easy to detect, even if loss per
ton-day is higher than in other, longer-term PHT
systems.
In general, to shift grain from traditional (ie usually
farm household) PHT systems to modern (usually off-
farm) systems is to use up capitaland fuelin
increased cross-haulage - and even (during seasons or
years of scarcity) in re-haulage, to the rural areas of
origin. Three defences, often advanced for incurring
such costs, are the requirements of urbanisation;
shifts of farm output to bigger farmers; and
concentration of production for surplus in a few
'successful' farming areas.
Urbanisation does require some new PHT outlays.
More people who need food now live far from the
point of production. Also there are economies of scale
avoiding the frequent transport. and addition to urban
stores, of numerous small amounts of grain. But this
does not make a good case for centralising such
operations as milling or hulling. Anyway the true rate
of net urbanisationthe growth of the urban share of
populationis rather low, not only in India but in
most parts of Asia and Africa.
Nor, within rural areas, is there good evidence that
cereal output is shifting towards big surplus farms.
5
Smaller farms, are, if anything, increasing their share
of both land and holdings. That is natural enough, in
view of population growth, the threat (if not often the
reality) of land ceilings, and the advantages of small
farmers in labour-intensive HYV production. The
persistence of self-feeding micro-farmersand
villagesremoves another alleged 'requirement' for a
shift of grain storage, away from user-growers.
However, a major regional shift of cereal outputa
concentration of production-for-surplus in the Punjab,
Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and coastal Tamilnadu and
Andhrahas taken place. This does entail some
centripetal changes in established patterns of grain
transport and storage. But changes required in PHT
patterns due to other factors, such as urbanisation or
(alleged) concentration of land, should not be
exaggerated. They do not, in any case, provide a good
reason for a major switch to large-scale or capital-
intensive forms of PHT. There is a strong case for
meeting the needs of at-risk poor and grain-deficit
rural areas and producers, to the extent possible, by
liens upon the household-level stores of surplus
producers; bought (by merchants or FCI) at harvest
time, but collected later, so that maximum flexibility
and decentralisation of stores, and of pre-storage PH
processes, is preserved as long as possible.
In any event, grain will be lost, not saved, if cash is
spent on large centralised PHT and on the associated
transport. Some such spending is needed, but should
be minimised. That is not only because it may waste
grain (and fossil fuel) and show poor rates of return. lt
is also because such policies inevitably shift control
and economic power away from small rural grain-
holders (including small farmers and even some landless
labourers) towards grain merchants, managers, and
power brokers, both private and public.
Local Improvements in PHT
Loss rates of only four to five per cent prevail in
traditional paddy storage in Andhra (typically about
40 per cent of the loss being due to insects and about
50-55 per cent due to rodents). Yet it pays, both
privately and socially. to teach local village builders
the sorts of design. siting, and plinth structures that
impede rat attacks. lt pays too, to fumigate improved
traditional stores. Locally-generated improvements
seem generally more economicand, as Tyagi shows
119811 much more labour-intensive - than the products
of organised industry.
For example, the net social benefit/cost ratios in
Andhra villages for metal bins were 1.08 to 1 (or 1.14
to 1 if appropriate up-weighting is given to benefits
accruing to poorer groups). However, for improvement
to the gode (large bamboo basket) the ratios were
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respectively 1.44 (1.51 with distributional weights).
Social returns on metal bins were much more marginal
and, given the costs and alternative uses of credit,
probably unattractive. These remarks also apply to
the private returns, despite attempts in some places to
subsidise metal bins. However, the case for local
improvement and against binsneed not apply in
all cases, especially a) if indoor storage is predominant
(increasing both bin life, and the vulnerability of less-
robust stores to nearby rats); or b) if big amounts of
grain are often held, so that less metal is needed per kg
of grain stored. Concrete and ferro-concrete structures
are hardly ever economic at farm-household levels.
lt is important to distinguish clearly between grain
savings, private returns to PHT improvement, and
social returns. In Andhra, even smallish grain savings
permit quite high private returns, because costs of
local improvements are low. Social rates of return are
higher still, mainly because improvements can be built
in the slack season when labourers have little other
work to do, whereas the benefit (saved grain) mostly
accrues near the end of the crop year, when food is
scarcest. In other circumstances social returns from
storage improvement could fall short of private returns,
for example if the rats, kept out of my grain store by an
improved plinth, merely invaded your store instead;
or if, kept out of both ourstores, they attacked grain in
the field, or in stores in other villages. Where (as in
Bangladeshand perhaps West Bengal) multi-cropping
makes average storage periods as short as two to three
months, loss rates may be too low to justify in economic
terms, even outlays on cheap and locally-made
improvements.
There is a widespread sense that important 'hidden
gains' exist to improved storagegains not fully
reflected in the low loss-rates reported by almost all
scientific studies of farm-level storage, nor in the
modest (if sometimes adequate) returns reported on
improvements. Such 'hidden gains' indeed exist, but
are very unlikely to justify outlay on large modern
PHT systems, which seldom save much grain. They
do, however, considerably strengthen the case for
locally-improved PHT where it might otherwise seem
a 'close decision'. It must always be remembered that
policymakersand farmershave to choose between
spending on PHT and on other investments, eg in field
loss prevention or in irrigation; and that these other
investments, too, may have 'hidden gains'. As far as
PHT goes, there are three ways in which the gains
from loss prevention might be more than is suggested
by measured loss-reductions, or by benefit/loss ratios
of prevention:
loss rates in sampled PHT processes or stores
might understate true food or value losses in the
sample, or omit some indirect sources of loss;
reported samples might underestimate country-
wide losses;
the costs of a given loss might exceed apparent
levels, due to the distribution of such costs among
persons, places or times.
Loss rates in the Andhra and Bangladesh studies are
based on weighing all crop movements in and out of
store, and crop-store probe samples at regular intervals
from loading to exhaustion of the store. Internal insect
infestation is deducted from crop weights by the
Ashman-Simon method. Tests for the most obvious
source of quality loss (uric acid attack, aflatoxins)
reveal negligible damage, and expectations of any
such damage would anyway be reflected in prices (and
thus in benefit/cost ratios) if even part of the stored
grain were sold. There remain four indirect sources of
omitted loss:
Weight loss of paddy due to insectsabout 40
per cent in Andhra of the 4.26 per cent average loss,
viz 1.7 per cent of stored paddy - should be raised by
about a quarter at the level of rice loss, to allow for the
'kernel selectivity' of insect pests. Hence about 4.7 per
cent of stored rice is lost to all sources of damage.
Losses due to infestation continue (probably
exponentially) after grain leaves the store. This is
significant only if the grain is then not soon eaten, but
stored for later consumption. Precision is impossible,
but it is very unlikely that such an effect would
increase the impact of storage loss at rice level to
above five per cent.
A five per cent storage loss, for the farmer, is just
like a five per cent cut in the price of his threshed
product. If it applies to all products, normal price-
elasticities of supply would suggest a responsive
rèduction in output of about one per cent, increasing
the true grain loss due to storage effects to about six
per cent of paddy.
Improved storage would probably increase the
offtake of HYVs. Both farmers' complaints and
laboratory testsin Andhra as elseheresuggest that
HYVs, often bred for high grain weight and good
germination, are (having thin husks) especially prone
to insect pests in storage, and at risk of sprouting in
seed store. In this way also, storage losses indirectly
cut availability of produced food.
Might our reported loss rates underrepresent farm-
level losses nationwide? We believe not. First, our
stratified sampling procedures, we believe, rendered
out loss estimates typical of Andhra Pradesh (and in
Bangladesh of the two thanas (administrative areas)
surveyed, themselves quite typical of their regions).
Second, the main single determinant of storage losses
may well be the period of storage. This averaged
about 3½ months in the Andhra sample (mean life of
store 7 months) and about 2 months in the Bangladesh
sample (mean life of store 4 months). Cropping
distribution in the Andhra villages, with about 71 per
cent of rice produced in.kharif and about 29 per cent
in rabi, shows about the same concentration as in
other areas though in some the proportions would be
roughly reversed; hence the 3½ month average storage
period may not be too untypical of paddy in India. (In
our Bangladeshi villages, cropping intensity averaged
2.0 as against about 1.5 for all Bangladesh; so the 2-
month average storage period is probably below
average. If the true average is 3 months, then storage
loss alone could be about 4½ per cent for raw and
about 3½ per cent for parboiled paddy, as against the
3.3 per cent and 2.5 per cent figures in our sample).
Third, our crop might show untypically low loss rates.
But rice is India's main food, and storage as paddy (as
in Andhra) involves higher loss rates than storage
parboiled. Moreover, the wetter South should feature
more intensive pest attack (and more crowding of
stores into rat-prone places) than the drier, less-densely-
populated North, and indeed the evidence on
wheatfrom the Ford Foundations earlier Punjab
study, and from the Delhi Union and Nepali work
L reported respectively by Wilson et al 1970, Singh et al
1981 and S. K. Bhalla 19811 does not show significantly
higher loss rates in store.
However, although we believe that our three to six per
cent food loss estimates in farm-level storage accurately
reflect the national pictures in India and Bangladesh,
we accept that they may underestimate the true cost
of these losses, in three ways:
The 'grains saved' become available at the season
of greatest need, when food would otherwise run out,
with credit dear, sometimes compelling debt or
mortgage.
Loss reduction cuts risk, because storage pests
concentrate heavily on selected places and times. For
example, in a region of Andhra where one-third of
grains are stored in outdoor gades, 6.2 per cent of
grain so stored was lost in 1975 but only 3.7 per cent in
1976.
Storage improvements normally appear to benefit
poor farmers most. (a) Both risk and seasonal impact
are most damaging to the poorest farmers who are
thus most helped by scale-neutral loss reductions. (b)
Unlike output rises, these need not be shared by
sharecroppers with their landlords. (c) Poorer farmers
store larger proportions of their grain (ie pressures to
distress sales are outweighed by the larger proportion
of grain needed for own-consumption, and the smaller
proportions sold, or used to pay hired labour). In
Andhra, farmers operating below three acres stored
62 per cent of paddy output, but farmers with above
nine acres stored only 53 per cent - a pattern repeated
in Bangladesh. (d) Poor farmers may suffer higher loss
rates (perhaps because both fumigation and the shift
from traditional to modern structures feature economies
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of scale); in outdoor godes, the main storage type in
our Andhra sample, small stores (below 30 bags) lost
5.9 per cent of stored paddy, but big stores (over 60
bags) only 2.5 per cent despite the larger storage
period.
So there are several reasons for 'shading upwards'
somewhatthough not drasticallyboth our loss
estimates and our benefit/cost ratios. However, storage
probably presents the most favourable case for cost-
effective local PHT improvements. Even here, multi-
crop villages, with smooth rundowns between each of
two or three annual replenishments from harvests, are
less attractive for storage improvements, because
storage losses are lower. We doubt whether the local
improvements feasible in Andhra would show attractive
benefit/cost ratios in Bangladesh: partly because
Bangladesh's higher cropping intensity reduces average
period in store, and thus cuts down insect pest damage
before exponential pest population growth has its
worst effects; partly because people are even poorer
and, in the case of women, more underemployed in
Bangladesh and therefore find it pays to make even
surer that grain is not lost in store; partly because in
Bangladesh, like SW India but unlike Andhra, people
often prefer parboiled rice, which has lower loss rates.
In non-storage PHT processes, prospects for cost-
effective localised improvements seem slenderer. At
least half the PH losses, we believe, are in storage. So
there is seldom much to be saved by spreading costs
over a long sequence of mini-lossesin threshing,
winnowing, drying (in most cases), milling, etc. It is
true that poor drying can greatly increase losses
afterwards, especially via moulds, and that wet harvest
conditions impede sun-drying. However, in Bagladesh,
large drying losses are so unusualtypically only in
one of the three harvest seasons is a really wet PH a
major risk - that it is seldom worth risking the purchase
of new drying equipment, which will oscillate between
long years of idleness and a few days of overuse and
possible breakdown. Moreover, despite much research,
no micro-drier, really competitive in wet years with
custom drying, for (say) the one to two hectare farmer,
has been developed.
In milling, husking etc the problem is different. True
loss ratesremember that brokens are not 'lost' but
are retrieved and eaten, cheap, by the poorestare
very low with traditional mortar-and-pestle methods.
But, per unit of throughput, labour-costs and even
capital costs are lower with huller mills (and their
'intermediate' but still costly equivalents for other
crops than paddy) than with mortar-and-pestle. There
is no technique in sight that can, in the medium term,
compete with these semi-modern huller techniques-
even unsubsidised - and be operated efficiently at the
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level of the one to two hectare farm. For milling, the
problem is to find ways of getting ownership or control
over the improved capitalor over alternative sources
of incometo the traditional PHT operators displaced
by it.
As for threshing, pedal-thresherscosting a few
hundred rupeesgive considerable grain savings (up
to 111/2 per cent of crop) as compared with animal,
road vehicle, etc threshing. A pedal thresher is a farm
purchase that, say, four to eight farmers, cultivating
one to two hectares each, might consider. Such
threshers, that is, not only cut production costs,
buteven though they do displace labourcan be
owned by the labour they displace. This would not be
practicable if land were very unequally distributed,
and credit unavailable to deficit farmers and the
landless. Otherwise, however, pedal-threshers could
comprise an effort-saving (rather than employment-
reducing) asset, ownable by very poor rural people,
and certainly less harmful to their chances of work
and food than threshing-machines. Notice that this
discussion says almost nothing about direct impact on
food losses. Even more than in storage, the effects of
PHT innovations in threshing and milling upon
employment and income-distribution are much more
important, in determining the outcome for the hungry
poor, than the (very small) direct impact on grain
availability.
Summarising, in storagethe main, though still small,
source of farm-household PH cereal lossesprospects
to innovate with locally produced, small-farm-level,
employment-intensive, grain-saving technology are
good, especially in one-crop areas. In threshing, four
to six small (including deficit) farms could together
economically operate a pedal-driven improvement -
desirable where landlessness and credit-famine are
not too serious. Efficient milling technology is somewhat
larger in scale; huller mills are often highly efficient,
but displace desperately poor traditional, mortar-and-
pestle custom-millers; really big modern rice mills
destroy jobs, do not save grain, and are highly
uneconomic in South Asia except when artificially
subsidised, as is all too often the case. In milling, as in
drying, few really competitive small-scale prospects
exist yetbut in drying the rate of return on bigger
technology also seems dubious.
The Heavy Options
Martin Greeley 119801 gives more details of the impact
of huller mills on employment, income and poverty in
rural Bangladesh. Work by Barbara Harriss 11976]
shows that in South India 'modern rice mills' have
even more serious effects on poor custom-hullers but
are not even efficient, or profitable unless subsidised.
As with driers, the uneven flow of throughput across
places, seasons and years is the main reason. So much
capital is locked up, with no alternative uses, a fixed
working life, and little physical mobility.
The FCI, following up a major government
commissioned programming exercise, have developed
a siting plan for long-term grain stocks. Given a 20-25
percent urban population, export possibilities in some
years, grain stocks again heading for 2Omn tonnes, yet
deficit years like 1979-80, only a fool will dismiss the
need for some heavy-capital-intensive urban stores,
specially since there are major economies of scale in
building materials, fumigation, and stock control as
stored quantity rises. Yet I wonder if enough thought
has been given to the option of leaving the grain,
bought up by FCI or by private merchants, in farm-
household stores until required. The gainsin
flexibility, personal overview, decentralisation, and
saved cross-haulagecould well outweigh the lost
economies-of-scale. That is especially the case when
both energy costs and transport bottlenecks appear to
worsen at unpredictable rates and times. 'Optimal'
location of big grain stores can look, suddenly, very
wrong if big uncertainties exist. For example, if there
is a sudden rise in the output of only some crops in
some places, the ability to use - or to create - widely
dispersed on-farm capacity is worth more than a lot of
existing but unfortunately located silos.
In the immediate post-harvest stage, heavy options
are two: the combine harvester and the reaper-binder.
The days of World Bank subsidies to combines are,
happily, over. Threshing machines attached to tractor
motors, are, however, often seen in the Punjab,
andprobably pay well, even without hidden subsidies
to fuel, credit or machinery. Yet plainly they displace
employment. There are two ways round this. A capitalist
solution would be to encourage more migration in the
threshing seasons, keeping wage-rates down so that it
did not pay to displace labour with machinery; this
solution is less inhumane than it seems, because the
wage bill (employment times the wage-rate) is certainly
higher this way than with the labour-replacing 'Punjabi
solution', once the shortage (and temporarily high
wage-rate) of migrant labour has induced labour-
replacing mechanisation. A socialist solution would
involve joint ownership and management of the
threshing machines by the displaced workers. What
economists have to see is that these problems demand
social solutions, whether capitalist or socialist. If the
'heavy' technology uses more capital and less labour,
price adjustments (even just desubsidisation) can make
it unattractive. But if the heavy' technology uses less
labour and less capital, it is likely to be a winner. Its
benefits are real and need spreading. Its employment
effects cannot be solved by fiddling with prices alone.
But, as explained, the intermediate optionthe pedal
thresherdoes provide an option. Its cost is low
enough for joint ownership by 'the poor' to be feasible.
No such obvious intermediate option is available in
milling. For rice, traditional technologies do seem to
be 'inferior' to huller mills, which use less labour and
less capital. The problem, acutely, is whether the
political and social system can provide assetsnot
necessarily, though perhaps most plausibly, in
PHTcomplementaiy to the labour of the persons
displaced. Experience with women's cooperative
ownership in the Cameroons and Bangladesh, provide
some grounds for hope.
The Effect on Hunger
In one-crop systems, and with especially valuable food
crops, small-scale and locally-made storage improve-
ments can be a cost-effective way to save significant
(though not sensational) amounts of grainand to do
so in such a way that poor people avoid costly loans,
and purchases, in hungry times. But many, perhaps
most, PHT innovations especially 'heavy' ones, which
take work from landless and near landless peopletend
to increase hunger. There is little saved grain, sometimes
none, and many jobs are lost.
Most PHT improvements that come onstream are
designed to save labour. They are developed for rural
areas in rich countries, where, even in slump, labour is
often scarce and dear. The greatest caution and
selectivity must be exercised in applying such
innovations to developing rural areas, which normally
feature low wages, high unemployment (especially
among the poorest and in slack seasons), and scarce
capital. The need for caution, in respect of PHT with
high capital/labour rates, should also affect the product-
mix. For example, the introduction of soya beans in
order to improve nutrition can be doubtful policy,
because the relatively expensive processing equipment
soaks up savings that could otherwise pay for capital
to produce food directlyand does so through
machinery that employs fewer people than does directly
food-producing equipment (eg minor irrigation
devices).
Do Lower Farm-level Losses Suggest
Decentralised PHT?
India now has very large public-sector grain stocks. A
good rabi in 1981 would bring them to 20 mn tons or
even more. Past experience shows that sudden surges
in central stocking requirements bring heavy losses in
temporary stores, serious transport bottlenecks, and
otherwise steeply-rising marginal costs. Moreover,
good and bad harvests do not alternate in convenient
fashion. A succession of good harvests, as in 1975-78,
means increasing strains and losses for centralised PH
storage and handling systems, both public and private.
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A succession of poor harvests can then sharply deplete
or exhaust stocks, already subject to severe
deterioration in the case of supposedly 'temporary'
crop-storage that had been prolonged during the period
of good harvests, ever-increasing inflows, and
unexpectedly small offtakes. When Joseph predicted
'seven fat years followed by seven lean years' and
advised precautionary storage, his biblical secretaries
did not, alas, record how he dealt with this problem.
Centralised access to large stores will remain
necessary.
I should like to propose that India's procurement and
public purchase agencies handle this problem by
gradually shifting their grain procurement and stocking
policy away from total stress on huge centralised
stores, towards the purchases of liens upon grain
stored by farm households. This proposal starts from
two observations. First, it does not follow from the
fact that central stocks (in whatever condition) are
now big, that substantial run-downs are welcome.
Particular regions can experience near-disaster before
others have gathered their seasonal crop, even if that
latter crop is excellent and the national average out-
turn for the year outstanding. 'Bad' national averages
can follow each other, while population continues to
rise. Meanwhile, we all hope that in India both real
income-per-person and the share of its total income
going to poor people will rise; but as they rise, so does
demand for grains. So the apparently large grain stock
is at risk of prolonged, and perhaps suddenly savage,
local and even national depletion. If the proposed
Indo-Soviet 'oil for wheat' barter deal goes through,
one hopes that a break clause in the event of
simultaneous bad harvests in India and the USSR (as
in 1972) will be incorporated; otherwise India might
again face severely depleted stocks, sky-high world
grain prices and a bad harvest all at once, but this time
aggravated by export commitments. But we start with
the observation of a large, vulnerable and necessary
centralised access to graintogether with big, rising
costs in centralised physical location, build up and
run-down of such grain.
The second observationarising from the work in
Andhra, Bangladesh and elsewhere reported in this
article - is that loss rates in small on-farm grain stores
are already low, but that there are often high social
and private returns to research, technology and
extension designed to cut these on-farm losses down
still further through locally-produced, labour-intensive
improvements. Analogous observations apply to other
PH processes, though farm-level losses (true losses,
not broken or shedded grain retrieved by others) in
some such processes may be so small that there is
more doubt about the economic viability of
improvements.
lo
From these two observationsthe need for centralised
access to grain, greater cheapness, loss-reduction,
economic efficiency, energy-saving, and benefits to
poor people, from decentralised, farm-household PH
storage and processing of graina strong policy
conclusion follows. Public, centralising authorities
responsible for handling grain (notably FCI) and
analogous private concerns (notably large urban grain
merchants), should modify their present policies of
physically procuring large amounts of grain at harvest,
storing (and often processing) that grain centrally, and
then re-selling itusually to urban markets near the
central store, but not infrequently to the very rural
areas that sold them the grain in the first place.
Instead, public authorities should decideand private
firms should be stimulated by price policiesto
purchase, from the farm household at harvest time,
claims upon some of the grain itself, or the option to
buy it if needed during a given period, while leaving to
the farmeragainst paymentthe costs of threshing,
drying, storing, and in many cases milling or hulling
the grain.
It is not a valid objection to say either 'the farmer
needs the money' or 'the farmer will not supply the
grain to the purchaser when it is claimed'. These
worries cancel each other out. If, for example, FCI
buys a lien on the grain, the farmer would receive the
full purchase price indeed, if FCI expects to buy (say)
three to six months after the harvest, it could pay
rather more than the harvest price, for the right to
collect the grain at any time up to, say, eight months
after harvest, whatever the market price. If FCI chose
the policy of buying only an option to purchase the
grain at harvest price during those eight months, it
could lend the farmer the difference between the
price of the option and the harvest price of
grainperhaps at a slightly concessional rate. In both
cases, FCI would raise the purchase price to allow for
storage, and perhaps other processing costs, borne by
the farmer. Corresponding to such transactions, the
farmer would be obligated to deliver grain, in good
condition, as stated. There is no reason to believe that
the costs, leakages, etcwhich there undoubtedly
would bewould exceed those from current policies
of centralisation of stocks, cross-haulage and re-
haulage.
Of course, any shift to such a lien system should be
gradual, and at first experimental. But it should be
stressed that the experiment should apply for five to
six years, being extended earlier if clearly successful,
but not being abandoned because of teething troubles.
It is important to see how the lien system compares
with centralised location over a series of years of
fluctuating stocking/destocking requirements. Also
the lien experiments should not be confined to surplus
regions or surplus farmers; poorer areas and poorer
farmers, now compelled (by the need to pay debts) to
make big sales (with physical crop movements)
immediately after harvest and to buy later, might gain
most, and provide most cost-effective PH overview, in
the lien system. Finally, the system's prospects of
success would be greatest if it were linked to field-
level research and extension involving the economic
costs and benefits, private and public, of locally-
produced improvements to 'traditional' PH systems.
Both the Indian Grain Storage Institute and the Save
Grain Campaign could benefit from FC! support,
while FC! could further cut its costs and its grain
losses.
These proposals, or similar ones, are not new. They
have been the subject of prolonged, though not
published, debate between, and perhaps within, the
Planning Commission and the Department of Food.
Since that debate took place, however, several things
have happened to strengthen the case for replacing, at
least experimentally, a significant and growing part of
centralised FC! grain stocks by stocks owned by FC!
(or covered by options so owned), but located at farm
level. First, the energy-costs of present patterns of
grain haulage, with its intense seasonal peaks (the
Khanna market in the Punjab is an extreme case),
have become increasingly unacceptable. Second, the
associated grain lossesin transport and in temporary
storagehave proved unexpectedly large. Third and
perhaps most important, the alleged vast post-harvest
losses, associated with the alternative of farm-household
storage of procured grain, have been shown, beyond
reasonable doubt, to be largely mythical. For these
reasons, there is a strong case for considering again,
and more favourably, as shift towards on-farm storage
(and gradual movement, as needed) of FC! grain
requirements; and for incentives to encourage
merchants' purchases to be similarly adjusted. This
case, it should be stressed, is completely independent
of the views one may hold about the role of public or
private sectors in the grain trade, or about the need for
centrally-owned grain stocks.
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